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Abstract
We examine how the banking sector may ignite the formation of asset price
bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, given
lack of observability of effort, loan officers (or risk takers) are compensated
based on the volume of loans but are penalized if banks suffer a high enough
liquidity shortfall. Outside banks, when there is heightened macroeconomic
risk, investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits. This
‘flight to quality’ leaves banks flush with liquidity, lowering the sensitivity
of bankers’ payoffs to downside risks of loans and inducing excessive credit
volume and asset price bubbles. The seeds of a crisis are thus sown. We
show that the optimal monetary policy involves a “leaning against liquidity”
approach: A Central Bank should adopt a contractionary monetary policy
in times of excessive bank liquidity in order to curb risk-taking incentives at
banks, and conversely, follow an expansionary monetary policy in times of
scarce liquidity so as to boost investment.
JEL Classifications: E32, E52, E58, G21
Keywords: Bubbles, flight to quality, Greenspan put, leaning against
liquidity, leaning against the wind, monetary policy, moral hazard
“For too long, the debate has got sidetracked. Into whether we can rely on
monetary policy ‘mopping up’ after bubbles burst. Or into whether monetary
policy could be used to control asset prices as well as doing its orthodox job of
steering nominal trends in the economy...” - Paul Tucker, Executive Director
for Markets and Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) member at the Bank
of England. (Bank of England’s Quarterly Bulletin 2008 Q2, Volume 48 No.
2)
1 Introduction
In the period leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, credit
and asset prices were growing at a ferocious pace.1 In the United States,
for example, in the five-year period from 2002 to 2007, the ratio of debt to
national income went up from 3.75 to one, to 4.75 to one. During this same
period, house prices grew at an unprecedented rate of 11% per year while
there was no evidence of appreciating borrower quality. The median house
price divided by rent in the United States2 over the 1975 to 2003 period
varied within a relatively tight band around its long-run mean. Yet starting
in late 2003, this ratio increased at an alarming rate. This rapid rise in asset
volume and prices met with a precipitous fall. In mid 2006, for instance, the
ratio of house price to rent in the United States flattened and kept falling
sharply until 2009 (See Figure 1).
What caused this tremendous asset growth and the subsequent puncture
is likely to intrigue economists for years. Some have argued that the global
economy was in a relatively benign low-volatility environment in the decade
leading up to the ongoing crisis (the so-called “Great Moderation”, see Stock
and Watson, 2002). Others argue that it is likely not a coincidence that the
phase of remarkable asset growth described above started at the turn of the
global recession of 2001—2002. In fact, in response to the unprecedented
rate of corporate defaults and heightened macroeconomic risk during that
1The series of facts to follow are borrowed from Acharya and Richardson (2009a).
2 In particular, this is the ratio of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) repeat-sale house price index to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shelter
index (i.e., gross rent plus utilities components of the CPI).
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Figure 1: House Price to Rent Ratio. The Figure graphs the demeaned
value of the ratio of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) repeat-sale house price index to the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) shelter index (i.e., gross rent plus utilities components of the CPI).
Because of demeaning, the average value of this ratio is zero.
recession, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to 1%, the lowest level
since 1958. A period of abundant availability of liquidity to the financial
sector ensued, large bank balance-sheets grew two-fold within four years, and
when the “bubble burst”, a number of agency problems within banks in those
years came to the fore. Such problems were primarily concentrated in centers
that were in charge of underwriting loans and positions in securitized assets.
Loan officers and risk-takers received huge bonuses based on the volume
of assets they originated and purchased rather than on (long-term) profits
these assets generated.3 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009) document that
this lending boom and bust cycle is in fact typical since several centuries,
usually (but not always) associated with bank lending and real estate, and
also often coincident with abundant liquidity in the form of capital inflows.
3See Rajan (2005, 2008) and Chapter 8 of Acharya and Richardson (2009b) for a discus-
sion of bank-level principal-agent problem — the “fake alpha” problem when performance
is measured based on short-term returns but risks are long-term or in other words in the
“tail” — and the role that this problem played in causing the financial crisis of 2007—2009.
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In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that explains why access to
abundant liquidity aggravates the risk-taking moral hazard at banks, giving
rise to excess lending and asset price bubbles. Somewhat perversely, this is
more likely to happen when the macroeconomic risk is high and investors
in the economy switch from investments to savings in the form of bank
deposits.4 We argue that these bubbles can be counteracted by Central
Banks with a contractionary monetary policy, and conversely can in fact be
exacerbated by an expansionary monetary policy. Expansionary monetary
policy may be tempting to persist with when macroeconomic risk is high,
but this may flush banks with (even more) liquidity, fueling credit booms
and asset price bubbles and sowing seeds of the next crisis.
After providing an informal description of our model in Section 2.1 we
develop a benchmark model in Section 2.2 wherein the representative bank
collects deposits from investors and then allocates a fraction of these deposits
to investment projects. The bank faces random deposit withdrawals and in
case of liquidity shortfalls suffers a penalty cost. The penalty cost could
be interpreted as the cost of fire sales or alternatively the cost of raising
external finance from markets. In order to avoid such costs the bank has
an incentive to set aside some reserves (cash and marketable assets or other
forms of ready liquidity). The rest of the deposits are invested in projects
(e.g. houses) depending on the demand for loans (e.g. mortgages). The bank
chooses the optimal lending rate that maximizes its expected profits subject
to the depositors’ participation constraint. We show in this benchmark
model that the bank lending rate appropriately reflects the underlying risk
of the project.
In Section 2.3 we enrich the model to study how agency problems within
the bank affect the pricing of loans. In practice, bankers and loan officers
(“bank managers”) often have incentives to give out excessive loans since
their payoffs are proportional to the amount of loans advanced.5 We show
4In the context of a global economy, this could correspond to heightened precautionary
levels of reserve moving from surplus countries into deficit countries in the form of holdings
of “safe assets” (Caballero (2010)).
5The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that “Most (loan officers) are paid
a commission based on the number of loans they originate.” (See the Bureau
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that such incentives can arise as part of an optimal contracting outcome of
a principal-agent problem when managerial action or effort is unobservable.
Consider a setting where the principal can conduct a (costly) audit to ver-
ify whether or not the manager had acted over-aggressively by sanctioning
excessive loans. Subsequent to an audit, if it is inferred that the manager
had indeed acted over-aggressively, the manager is penalized a fraction of
the penalty costs incurred by the bank arising from liquidity shortfalls. We
show that it is ex post optimal for the bank to conduct an audit only if the
liquidity shortfall suffered by the bank is large enough. In this setup, the
optimal managerial compensation is increasing in the volume of loans but
if the manager underprices the risk of the investments (in order to sanction
excessive loans) he faces the risk of a penalty if the bank suffers a significant
liquidity shortfall. Hence, the mispricing of risk in bank loans only occurs
when the bank is awash with liquidity (deposits) since in this case the man-
ager rationally attaches little weight to the scenario where the bank might
later face liquidity shortfalls. In other words, excessive liquidity encourages
managers to disregard downside risk, increase loan volume and underprice
the risks of projects.
We then show in Section 2.4 that such behavior ultimately has an impact
on asset prices. We assume that the demand for loans arises from invest-
ments by the household sector in underlying assets of the economy. To show
how asset price “bubbles” are formed we first define the “fundamental” asset
prices as those that arise in the absence of any agency frictions within banks.
We construct the optimal demand function for assets by bank borrowers and
then solve for the underlying asset price given the market clearing condition
that the aggregate demand for assets should equal their finite supply. If the
bank lending rate underprices risks, then there is an increase in aggregate
borrowing from banks. This in turn fuels an excessive demand for assets
in the real sector which leads to prices rising above their fundamental val-
ues. We interpret this asset price inflation as a “bubble”. Importantly, such
bubbles are formed only when bank liquidity is high enough as only then do
of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2008-09 Edition available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos018.htm#earnings.)
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bank managers underprice risk.
Next, in Section 3 we study when bank liquidity is likely to be high and
thus asset price bubbles are most likely to be formed. We show that this is
the case when the macroeconomic risk in the economy is high. When macro-
economic risk increases, depositors avoid direct entrepreneurial investments
and prefer to save their money in bank deposits which are perceived to be
safer. Gatev and Strahan (2006) offer direct empirical evidence consistent
with this effect. In our model, such “flight to quality” results in excessive
bank liquidity and induces bubble formation in line with our earlier results.
Finally, we study the implications of the results for optimal monetary
policy. We show that if the Central Bank adopts a contractionary mon-
etary policy in times of excessive bank liquidity, then it can counter the
flight to quality by drawing out the increases in bank liquidity and avoiding
the emergence of bubbles. On the contrary, if the Central Bank adopts an
expansionary monetary policy then this accentuates the formation of bub-
bles. Intuitively, an increase in the money supply only serves to increase
bank liquidity further when there is already a flight to quality of deposits.
Our model can thus explain how lax monetary policy by the Scandinavian
Central Banks in 1980’s, Bank of Japan during 1986-1987, and the Fed-
eral Reserve in the United States during the latter phase of the Greenspan
era culminated in housing and real estate bubbles in these countries. In
contrast, in times of scarce bank liquidity, banks raise lending rates which
adversely affects aggregate investment. We show that during these times
if the Central Bank adopts an expansionary monetary policy then it can
boost aggregate investment by effectively injecting liquidity into the bank-
ing system. We thus argue in Section 4 that the optimal monetary policy
involves a “leaning against liquidity” approach, and that “leaning against
macroeconomic risk” is not necessarily the desirable policy.
Proponents of the ‘Greenspan camp’ argue that monetary policy should
not be geared towards avoiding the emergence of bubbles and should focus
instead on targeting the natural interest rate and the natural rate of employ-
ment as has traditionally been the case. This is justified on the basis that
central banks cannot pinpoint an asset price bubble. Nevertheless, we prove
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that targeting bank liquidity is optimal even if central banks are not aware
of where the economy is in the business cycle. Since the asset price bubble
is intuitively tied to bank liquidity, we believe that the central banks’ task
in identifying times for employing a contractionary policy is not as onerous
as is often suggested: its task should be to track the extent of liquidity of
the banking (more broadly, financial intermediation) sector.6
In Section 5 we discuss the related literate and finally in Section 6, we
conclude.
2 The model
2.1 Informal description
The overall economy consists of several sectors, namely, banking sectors,
savers, borrowers (both savers and borrowers are referred to as households,
for simplicity), entrepreneurial sector (corporations, for simplicity), and the
central bank. We do not introduce all interactions across these sectors at
once. Instead for pedagogical reasons and clarity of exposition, we build a
series of models that either augment each other or add the missing pieces
not analyzed till that point.
We start with the banking sector receiving deposits from the savers and
determining its loan decisions. We then introduce the borrowers who de-
mand assets (houses) based on borrowing from the bank (mortgages). Given
the demand and supply of assets we determine asset prices. Next we in-
6 In fact, a number of economists, including those who traditionally believed that mone-
tary policy should not react to asset price bubbles, have revised their priors on its conduct.
Some examples include: (i) “Given the events of the last eight months, it would be foolish
not to reconsider the Greenspan doctrine,” by Kenneth Rogoff, Financial Times, 16 May
2008; (ii) “I think I am still with the orthodoxy but I have to admit that recent events are
sowing seeds of doubt,” by Alan Blinder, Financial Times, 16 May 2008; (iii) “A Central
Bank should bear in mind those long-run consequences of asset price bubbles and finan-
cial imbalances in the setting of current interest rates,” by Charles Bean, Financial Times,
16 May 2008; and, (iv) “We need a new philosophical approach...which recognises that
market liquidity is beneficial up to a point but not beyond that point...” by Lord Turner,
Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, Financial Times, 18 March 2010.
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troduce the entrepreneurial sector that can raise direct financing from the
savers. The extent of entrepreneurial sector’s risk determines what level of
bank deposits the savers choose (“flight to quality”). Finally, the central
bank can draw out these deposits or further increase bank liquidity through
its monetary policy. We then examine the implications for optimal monetary
policy.
2.2 Bank lending: Base case
We consider a three-period model of a bank that at t = 0 receives deposits
D from risk-neutral investors (savers of the economy). For now, D is given.
Each investor deposits 1 unit of his endowment in the bank. The reservation
utility of depositors is given by u¯. Hence in order to secure deposits the bank
needs to set the rate of return on deposits, rD, such that the depositors earn
an expected payoff of at least u¯.
The bank subsequently makes investments in projects (“loans”) while
holding a fraction of the deposits as liquid reserves, R. The bank-funded
projects either succeed or fail at t = 2. The probability of success of bank
projects is given by θ and in the event the project is successful it pays off
at t = 2. The project is illiquid in the sense that if it were to be liquidated
prematurely at t = 1, the bank faces a penalty or a liquidation cost. The
bank observes θ and sets rL which is the (gross) rate of return on loans.
When choosing the lending rate, the bank takes into account the demand
function for loans (by the households that are borrowers) which is given by
L (rL) where L0 (rL) < 0. Bank reserves are thus given by:
R = D − L (rL) .
The bank may experience withdrawals at t = 1 and for simplicity we
assume that the fraction of depositors who experience a liquidity shock and
withdraw is a random variable given by x˜, where x ∈ [0, 1].7 The cumulative
7As in Allen and Gale (1998) and Naqvi (2007) we could have assumed that x˜ is
correlated with asset quality news in the sense that depositors receive a noisy signal of θ
on which they base their decision on whether or not to run. While this is more realistic, it
does not affect our qualitative results but highly complicates the analysis. Hence similar
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distribution function of x˜ is given by F (x) while the probability distribution
function is denoted by f (x). Each depositor who withdraws early receives 1
unit of his endowment back at t = 1. Thus the total amount of withdrawals
at t = 1 is given by x˜D. If the realization of x˜D is greater than R, then the
bank faces a liquidity shortage, and it incurs a penalty, given by rp (xD −R),
which is proportional to the liquidity shortage, where rp > rL > 1.
The penalty can be justified in a number of ways. The bank may be
forced to cover the shortfall in a costly manner by selling some of its assets
prematurely at fire-sale prices. This is particularly likely when firms in
other industries are also facing difficulties.8 Alternatively the bank can raise
external financing via capital markets. However, this is also privately costly
because raising equity leads to dilution of existing shareholders due to the
debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977). Furthermore, raising external finance
may entail a price impact due to the adverse selection problem a la Myers
and Majluf (1984). Capital raising can also entail deadweight costs related
to monitoring that the new financiers must undertake. Finally, if the bank
attempts to cover the shortfall by emergency borrowing from the central
bank, this can also be costly as the central bank may charge a penalty rate.
And, apart from pecuniary costs, the bank may also suffer non-pecuniary
costs such as a reputational cost, e.g., the stigma associated with borrowing
from the central bank’s emergency facilities.
Reverting to the model, if the projects financed by bank borrowings
are successful, then the bank is solvent and is able to repay the patient
depositors the promised rate of return of rD at t = 2, whilst the equityholders
consume the residual returns. However, in case of the failure of bank-funded
to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Prisman, Slovin and Sushka (1986) we assume that
x˜ is random.
8Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the price that distressed firms receive for their
assets is based on industry conditions. In particular, the distressed firm is forced to sell
assets for less than full value to industry outsiders when other industry firms are also
experiencing difficulties. There is strong empirical support for this idea in the corporate-
finance literature, as shown, for example, by Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996), Pulvino
(1998), Stromberg (2000), and Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2006). James (1991)
provides evidence of such specificity for banks and financial institutions.
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t = 0
• Bank raises deposits
• Bank observes success
  probabilit L
• Investments made
  and bank sets aside
reserves R
t = 1
• Bank suffers early
  withdrawals, xD
• Bank incurs a penalty
cost if xD>R
t = 2
• Bank projects
  either succeed
 with probabilit
  or fail
• Payoffs divided
  among parties
Figure 2: Benchmark model: Timeline of events
projects, the surplus reserves, R−x˜D, if any, are divided amongst the patient
depositors whilst the equityholders consume zero. The sequence of events is
summarized in the timeline depicted in Figure 2.
Given this setup, the bank owners’ problem is as follows:
max
r∗L,r
∗
D,R
∗
Π = π − rpE [max (x˜D −R, 0)] (1)
subject to
E (x˜) + (1−E (x˜))
∙
θrD + (1− θ)
E [max (R− x˜D, 0)]
(1−E (x˜))D
¸
≥ u¯ (2)
where π is given by:
π = θ {rLL (rL)− rDD (1−E (x˜)) +E [max (R− x˜D, 0)]} . (3)
The above program says that the bank chooses deposit and lending rates
as well as the level of bank reserves so as to maximize its expected profits,
π, net of any penalty incurred in case of liquidity shortage and subject
to the participation constraint of the depositors given by expression (2). A
depositor withdraws his funds early with a probability of E (x˜) in which case
he receives a payoff of 1. With a probability of (1−E (x˜)) the depositor
does not experience a liquidity shock in which case he receives a promised
payment of rD if the bank projects succeed (which is with probability θ).
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In case of the failure of bank investments (which happens with probability
1−θ), any surplus bank reserves are divided amongst the patient depositors.
Thus expression (2) states that the depositors must on average receive at
least their reservation utility. Equation (3) represents the expected profit
of the bank exclusive of the penalty costs. With probability (1− θ) bank
profits are zero since the bank-funded projects fail. With probability θ
the projects succeed in which case the bank’s expected profit is given by
the expected return from the loans (rLL (rL)) minus the expected cost of
deposits (rDD [1−E (x˜)]) plus the expected value of net reserve holdings at
the end of the period (which is given by the last term of the equation).9
We next solve the bank’s optimization problem and derive the first-
best lending rate, deposit rate, and level of bank reserves. The results are
summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 1. The optimal gross lending rate is given by
r∗L =
1 + (rp − 1)Pr (x˜D ≥ R∗)
θ
³
1− 1ηL
´ (4)
where ηL = −rLL0 (rL) /L > 0 is the elasticity of the demand for loans.
The optimal gross deposit rate is given by
r∗D =
(u¯−E (x˜))D − (1− θ)E [max (R∗ − x˜D, 0)]
θ (1−E (x˜))D . (5)
And, the optimal level of reserves is given by:
R∗ = D − L (r∗L) .
2. (Risk effect) ∂r
∗
L
∂θ < 0, i.e., an increase in risk (1− θ), ceteris paribus,
increases the equilibrium lending rate.
9Note that for simplicity we have considered a setup with a given penalty cost. In the
online appendix, we consider a setup wherein the penalty costs are explicitly calculated
in an environment where the bank finances the shortfall by selling its assets at fire-sale
prices. We show that in this three-period environment, the objective function of the bank
is analogous to equation (1) and is given by π minus a cost term which is proportional to
the bank’s liquidity shortfall. Since our qualitative results remain unchanged, we use the
simpler setup given its parsimony and tractability.
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3. (Liquidity effect) ∂r
∗
L
∂D < 0, i.e., an increase in bank liquidity, ceteris
paribus, decreases the equilibrium lending rate.
It is interesting to note that as the elasticity of demand for loans de-
creases, the lending rate increases and hence the spread between the loan
rate and deposit rate increases. This result is consistent with the Monti-
Klein (Klein, 1971 and Monti, 1972) model. The second and third parts
of the proposition are also intuitive. The lending rate prices both project
risk and bank liquidity. An increase in liquidity lowers the expected cost of
liquidity shortage and the bank passes some of this benefit to the borrowers
via a lower loan rate.
2.3 Agency problem at banks and over-lending
2.3.1 Setting of the problem
We now consider agency issues between the bank equityholders and the
bank manager. A study by OCC (1988) found that “Management-driven
weaknesses played a significant role in the decline of 90 percent of the failed
and problem banks the OCC evaluated... directors’ or managements’ overly
aggressive behavior resulted in imprudent lending practices and excessive
loan growth.” They also found that 73% of the failed banks had indulged
in over-lending. This suggests that principal-agent problems within banks
have been one of the key reasons for bank failures and that bank managers
often tend to engage in ‘overly aggressive risk-taking behavior’.10 Perhaps
even more striking evidence is presented by the financial crisis of 2007-2009
which has revealed that in the period preceding the crisis, mortgage lenders,
traders and large profit/risk centers at a number of financial institutions had
paid themselves substantial bonuses based on the size of their risky positions
rather than their long-run profitability. Moreover, in many cases, it was
a conscious choice of senior management to silence the risk management
10The OCC’s study is based on an analysis of banks that failed, became problems and
recovered, or remained healthy during the period 1979-1987. The study analysed 171 failed
banks to identify characteristics and conditions present when the banks deteriorated.
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groups that had spotted weaknesses in the portfolio of building risks.11
To study how such managerial agency problems can have an effect on
bank policies, we model the agency problem within banks explicitly. Let e
denote the unobservable effort level of the manager, such that e ∈ {eL, eH},
where eH > eL. We assume that although the loans are affected by effort,
they are not fully determined by it. The stochastic relationship is neces-
sary to ensure that effort level remains unobservable. We assume that the
distribution of loan demand L (rL) conditional on eH first-order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution conditional on eL. In other words, for a
given level of lending rate, the manager on average makes a higher volume
of loans when he exerts high effort relative to the case where he exerts lower
effort, i.e., E [L (rL) |eH ] > E [L (rL) |eL]. Furthermore, we suppose that
[Π|eH −Π|eL] > E [w|eH ] − E [w|eL]. This means that the incremental in-
crease in the expected profit from implementing a high effort is greater than
the increase in the expected wage costs from implementing the high effort.
In other words the principal has an incentive to implement the high effort
level since the gains from doing so are greater than the associated costs.
The principal can impose a penalty, ψ, on the manager if it is ‘inferred’
ex post that the manager had acted over-aggressively. However, to make
such an inference, the principal must conduct an audit to verify whether
or not the manager had acted over-aggressively. Audits are costly and the
cost of an audit is given by z
³
Πˆ
´
, where Πˆ represents the realized value
of the bank’s profit net of costs resulting from liquidity shortfalls, if any.
Following Dye (1986) we assume that audit costs are increasing in output:
z0
³
Πˆ
´
> 0.12 Let φ denote the probability of conducting an audit and let ζ
denote the probability that the manager is inferred to be over-lending and
11See Chapter 8 of Acharya and Richardson (2009b), which contains a detailed account
of governance and management failures at a number of financial institutions. The most
detailed evidence is for UBS based on its “Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write Downs”
prepared in 2008 for the Swiss Federal Banking Commission.
12Dye (1986) implicitly assumes that an increase in output due to the manager’s efforts
translates to an increase in profits. Moreover, even if the pecuniary audit costs do not
vary with output, the non-pecuniary audit costs are likely to be higher when profits are
high since during these times it is more difficult to justify an audit. Furthermore, there
is significant empirical evidence that bigger firms incur higher audit costs. To the extent
12
penalized if an audit is carried out. The audit technology is imperfect but
correlated to the manager’s choice of lending rate relative to the first-best
rate: ζ > 1/2 if rL < r
f
L but ζ < 1/2 if rL = r
f
L, where r
f
L denotes the
first-best loan rate.
The manager is an expected utility maximizer with a Bernoulli utility
function u (w,ψ, e) over his wages w, potential penalty ψ and effort e. The
utility function satisfies uw (w,ψ, e) > 0, uww (w,ψ, e) < 0, uψ (w,ψ, e) < 0,
uψψ (w,ψ, e) > 0, and ue (w,ψ, e) < 0 (where the subscripts denote the
partial derivatives). This implies that the manager prefers more wealth
to less, he is risk averse, dislikes penalties and dislikes high effort. More
specifically we assume that the utility function is additively separable and
is given by u (w,ψ, e) = v (w) − c (ψ) − e, where v0 (w) > 0, v00 (w) < 0,
c0 (ψ) > 0 and c00 (ψ) > 0. The manager’s reservation utility is given by uo.
2.3.2 Symmetric-information problem
As a benchmark, assume principal has same information as the manager.
In the presence of symmetric information, the possibility of manager being
penalized for over-lending implies that there is no agency problem and the
bank’s problem is analogous to that of Section 2.2 with the bank maximizing
Π = π − rpE [max (x˜D −R, 0) |e = eH ] (6)
subject to the following participation constraint
E (x˜) + (1−E (x˜))
∙
θrD + (1− θ)
E [max (R− x˜D, 0) |e = eH ]
(1−E (x˜))D
¸
≥ u¯ (7)
where π is given by
π = θ {rLE [L (rL) |eH ]− rDD (1−E (x˜)) +E [max (R− x˜D, 0) |e = eH ]}
(8)
The first-best lending rate analogous to equation (4) is given by
rfL =
1 + (rp − 1)Pr
£¡
x˜D ≥ R¯
¢ |e = eH¤
θ
³
1− 1η¯L
´ (9)
that highly profitable firms also have a high market capitalization, such firms would have
higher audit costs relative to less profitable firms.
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where η¯L = −rL
∂E[L(rL)|eH ]/∂rL
E[L(rL)|eH ] > 0 and R¯ = D − E [L (rL)]. The only
difference with Proposition 1 is that loan demand is expected rather than
realized at t = 0.
2.3.3 Contractual problem under asymmetric information
Next, we allow for asymmetric information which introduces the agency
problem. The manager can observe the quality of the project, θ, and also
the specific level of bank liquidity, D, at the time he is setting the loan
rate. However, this information is not available to the principal at the time
of setting the contract. Hence, the principal cannot ‘infer’ the first-best
loan rate and verify whether or not the manager had acted over-aggressively
(unless it conducts an audit at t = 1).
We assume that the principal does not observe project quality, observes
the distribution of bank liquidity (rather than its exact level) and that liq-
uidity is non-verifiable. This is plausible given that in reality liquidity is
not even well-defined as it can take several forms and managers have great
flexibility in where to “park” liquidity. For example, bank liquidity may be
lent out to other banks via the interbank market or conversely it may be
the excess liquidity of other banks that makes it way to the bank in ques-
tion. It is also particularly difficult to verify off-balance sheet liquidity which
may take the form of unused loan commitments or repurchase agreements
or exposure to recourse from special purpose vehicles.
Thus, the time line is as depicted in Figure 3: At t = 0 the principal
offers a contract to the manager (such that eH is chosen). Subsequently,
the manager observes project risk, receives deposits D, chooses effort e, and
sets the loan rate, rL. At t = 0.5, for a given level of rL the volume of loans
L (rL) will be realized, investments are made and reserves are set aside. As
before, at t = 1 there may be early withdrawals which can lead to penalty
for the bank. The principal then decides whether or not to conduct an audit.
If an audit is conducted the manager may be penalized depending on the
inference obtained from the audit outcome. Finally at t = 2 the payoffs are
realized and divided between the parties given the contractual terms.
In this asymmetric information setting, the contract that the principal
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t = 0
• Principal offers contract
to manager
• Manager observes success
  probabilit Deposits D
  are received
• Manager sets rL
• Manager chooses e
 • Loan demand
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 • Manager makes
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t = 0.5 t = 1
• A fraction x of
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cost if xD>R
• Principal decides
  whether or not to
conduct audit.
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contingent on the
 audit outcome
t = 2
• Bank projects
  succeed with
  probabilit
• Payoffs realized
  and divided among
 parties
Figure 3: Timeline of events.
offers the manager specifies the compensation of the manager in the form
of wages, w, penalties, ψ, as well as the “audit policy”, φ. The audit policy
is the likelihood with which the principal audits at t = 1 and under which
scenarios. Since audit is costly, we consider time-consistent audit polcies
only. Since the wages are paid at t = 2, w, ψ and φ can be contingent on
the outcomes observed by then, namely the loan demand L and liquidity
shortfall S ≡ max (xD −R, 0). In particular, w = w (L) since wages are
compensation for marketing loans, whilst, ψ = ψ (S) since penalties are a
form of punishment for inducing liquidity shortfalls.13
More specifically, the principal needs to solve the following program:
max
w(L),ψ(S),φ(S)
Π− (E [w (L)]−E [ψ (S)])−E (z) (10)
subject to
E [v (w(L))]−E [c (ψ (S))]− e ≥ uo (11)
13Note that S does not give any additional information (relative to L) regarding whether
or not manager made an effort to sell loans. It follows that w = w (L). On the other hand,
S contains all the information contained in L regarding whether or not the manager had
acted over-aggressively. Technically S is a sufficient statistic for L regarding inference
of over-aggressive behavior of the manager. (See Holmstrom (1979). It follows that
ψ = ψ (S).
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E [v (w(L)|eH)]− eH ≥ E [v (w(L)|eL)]− eL (12)
E
h
c
³
ψ (S) |rL = rfL
´i
≤ E
h
c
³
ψ (S) |rL < rfL
´i
(13)
where S = max (xD −R, 0) represents the liquidity shortfall of the bank, if
any. The above program says that the principal chooses the compensation
schedule so as to maximize his expected profits minus the expected compen-
sation of the manager minus the expected audit costs subject to a number
of constraints. Constraint (11) is the participation constraint which says
that the manager’s utility must be at least equal to his reservation utility.
Constraint (12) is the incentive compatibility constraint for inducing high
managerial effort. Constraint (13) is the incentive constraint for setting the
first-best rate. The constraint says that the expected managerial disutility
from the penalty is higher when the manager acts over-aggressively com-
pared to the case where he sets the first-best lending rate. We can then
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The managerial compensation contract is such that wages,
w, are increasing in loan volume, L. However, if an audit is conducted
and it is inferred that the manager had acted over-aggressively then he is
penalized such that the managerial penalty, ψ, is increasing in the bank’s
liquidity shortfall, S. In other words, w0 (L) > 0 and ψ0 (S) > 0.
The intuition is straightforward. If managerial compensation only de-
pends on the volume of loans, then the manager will be incentivized to lower
lending rates and increase lending as much as possible because he will not
be penalized when low bank liquidity adversely impacts ability to meet net
depositor withdrawals. In this case, the volume of loans will be excessive,
reserves will be too low and hence liquidity shortages very likely. However,
the presence of a penalty upon audit which is increasing in the bank’s liquid-
ity shortfall creates a trade-off for the manager. The manager can increase
his payoffs by setting a low loan rate and increasing the loan volume. But,
an increase in loan volume can trigger a liquidity shortfall and subsequently
the manager faces the risk of being audited and penalized.14 We exploit
14Note that in the absence of constraint (13) there would have been no trade-off and
thus the manager would have had no incentive to avoid a shortfall whatsoever.
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this trade-off below in Proposition 4 where we show that once the manager
receives deposits, the threat of being penalized ex post implies that the man-
ager will take into account the level of bank liquidity when deciding whether
or not to under-price loan risk.
In remainder of the analysis, we assume for simplicity that contracts are
linear15 so that the manager receives a proportion β of loans in the form of
bonuses or wages, but is penalized a proportion γ of the bank’s own penalty
costs. Thus the expected penalty cost of the manager conditional on an
audit conducted by the principal is given by E [(ψ (S)) |audit] = ζE [γrpS].
This is because conditional upon audit the manager is deemed to overlend
with probability ζ, and his share of bank penalty is γ giving rise to his
total expected penalty of ζE [γrpS] in the event of an audit. Similarly,
the expected disutility from penalty conditional on an audit is given by
E [c (ψ (S)) |audit] = ζE [c (γrpS)].
Next, we solve for the optimal audit policy, φ, as well as the proportion of
the penalty, γ, that the manager is charged in the event that he is punished.
In order to do this we add the following constraints to the problem faced by
the principal.
φ ∈ [0, 1] (14)
γ ∈ [0, γ¯] (15)
where γ¯ ≤ 1. Constraint (14) simply says that the probability of an audit
varies between 0 and 1. Along the lines of Baron and Besanko (1984),
constraint (15) says that there is an upper bound on the punishment that
can be imposed on the manager and that at most the manager incurs the
entire penalty cost suffered by the bank. We can then prove the following
proposition.
15The assumption of linear contracts is for simplicity and has no bearing on our re-
sults. Furthermore, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) argue that real-world compensation
schemes involve linear contracts as more complex contracts are subject to costly “gaming”
by agents. Holmstrom and Milgrom show that in a dynamic environment with CARA
preferences and (binomial) i.i.d. increments in output, optimal linear contracts can be
obtained.
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Proposition 3 The principal will conduct an audit at t = 1 if and only if
the liquidity shortfall suffered by the bank exceeds some threshold S∗. Thus
the optimal audit timing as defined by the audit probability, φ, is given by
φ =
(
1
0
if S > S∗
otherwise
. (16)
Subsequent to an audit if it is inferred that the manager had acted over-
aggressively, the principal will charge the maximum penalty to the manager
and thus the manager will bear a proportion, γ¯, of the bank’s penalty costs.
The intuition is as follows. By verifying whether or not the agent had
acted over-aggressively when liquidity shortfalls are substantial and punish-
ing him with the maximum penalty if it is inferred that he had underpriced
risk, the principal discourages the agent from setting a loan rate that is
below the first-best. Furthermore, if there are no liquidity shortfalls or liq-
uidity shortfalls are minimal then that sends a signal to the principal that
the manager was less likely to have acted over-aggressively and to have re-
served sufficient liquidity. Moreover, in the case of liquidity shortfalls if it
is inferred that the manager had underpriced risk he is asked to contribute
a proportion of the losses. In the absence of liquidity shortfalls there is no
such “return” to the principal from incurring the cost of an audit and hence
there is no incentive ex post to conduct an audit. As in Baron and Besanko
(1984), the maximum possible penalty is optimal since the benefit of an
audit rises with the managerial penalty.16
2.3.4 Liquidity-induced agency problem
Given the results that optimal wages are increasing in loan volume and that
an audit is triggered when liquidity shortfall is sufficiently high, we can prove
the following proposition.
16 It is not difficult to show that in the presence of an additional limited liability con-
straint whereby the manager’s total penalty cannot exceed ψ¯, the managerial penalty
would be given by ψ = min

γ¯rpS, ψ¯

. It is thus in the interest of the principal to impose
the maximum possible penalty as long as the limited liability constraint is not violated.
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Proposition 4 The manager will engage in overly-aggressive behavior if
and only if bank liquidity, D, is sufficiently high.
The above proposition says that for high enough bank liquidity the man-
ager has an incentive to engage in overly-aggressive behavior by mispricing
in the loan rate the underlying risk of loans. In other words, the agency
problem is only actuated when bank liquidity is high enough. This is be-
cause even though the manager bears a proportion of the penalty costs, in
the presence of excessive liquidity, the probability of experiencing a liquidity
shortage is low. As argued above (Proposition 3), with low or no liquidity
shortage, it is not ex post efficient for the principal to incur the costs of an
audit. This encourages the manager to engage in excessive lending. Put
another way high liquidity has an ‘insurance effect’ on the manager: the
manager’s compensation becomes more sensitive to loan volume when liq-
uidity is high incentivizing him to lend below the first-best rate to make
more loans. On the other hand, for low enough liquidity the agency prob-
lem is not actuated and the manager does not sanction excessive loans for
fear of incurring a penalty in the event of a liquidity shortfall.
Given the result of Proposition 4 we can also show that the liquidity
threshold, D∗, above which an agency problem is actuated, decreases as
the precision of the audit technology worsens. An increase in the likelihood
of making incorrect inferences regarding managerial behavior implies that
the principal is more likely to penalize the manager even if he had not acted
over-aggressively (Type I error) and at the same time is less likely to penalize
the manager when he had acted over-aggressively (Type II error). Thus the
manager’s expected utility from acting over-aggressively increases relative
to the case where he does not misprice risk. This exacerbates the distortion
in managerial incentives and can be interpreted as the outcome of poor risk
management and governance functions inside the bank.
2.4 Asset pricing and bubbles
Next we introduce an asset market to the model and consider the asset
pricing implications of our results. We define the fundamental asset price
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as the price that would arise in the absence of any distortions created by
agency problems. We then compare the fundamental asset price with the
actual asset price which may or may not be distorted depending on whether
or not agency problems have been actuated within the banking system. To
facilitate this comparison we first model the asset demand by bank borrowers
which was so far taken as given. We assume that there exists a continuum
of risk-neutral borrowers (e.g. home-owners or indebted households) who
have no wealth and hence need to borrow in order to finance investments
(homes, cars, etc.).
We analyze the behavior of a representative borrower. This implies that
the equilibrium is symmetric and that all borrowers choose the same portfo-
lio. This also implies that the bank cannot discriminate between borrowers
by conditioning the terms of the loan on the amount borrowed or any other
characteristic. Hence, borrowers can borrow as much as they like at the
going rate of interest.
Let P denote the price of one unit of the asset. LetXd denote the number
of units of the asset demanded by the representative borrower and X˜s (P )
denote the total supply of the risky asset. The supply of the asset, X˜s (P ),
is stochastic. Furthermore, X 0s (P ) > 0 for any realization Xs (P ). This
implies that if house prices are high for instance, there is greater construction
of homes and hence the supply of houses increases. The asset returns a
cash flow (or cash flow equivalent of consumption) of C per unit with a
probability of θ. As in Allen and Gale (2000) we assume the borrowers face
a non-pecuniary cost of investing in the risky asset b (Xd) which satisfies the
usual neoclassical properties: b (0) = b0 (0), b0 (Xd) > 0 and b00 (Xd) > 0 for
all Xd > 0. The purpose of the investment cost is to restrict the size of the
individual portfolios and to ensure the concavity of the borrower’s objective
function. Risk aversion on part of borrowers would lead to similar results.
The optimization problem faced by the representative borrower is to
choose the amount of borrowing so as to maximize expected profits:
max
Xd
θ [CXd − rLPXd]− b (Xd) . (17)
Note that the borrower has to pay an interest of rL on its borrowing as
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offered by the bank at t = 0. The market-clearing condition for the asset is:
Xd = Xs. (18)
The first-order condition of the problem (17) is as follows:
θ [C − rLP ]− b0 (Xd) = 0 (19)
Setting Xd = Xs in the first order condition and letting τ (Xd) = b0 (Xd)
denote the marginal investment cost, the equilibrium unit asset price is given
by the fixed-point condition:
P ∗ =
θC − τ (Xs (P ∗))
θrL
. (20)
As expected, the asset price is the discounted value of the expected cash
flows net of the investment cost. It is also clear that there is a one-to-one
mapping from the (gross) lending rate, rL, to the asset price, P . To see this,
take the derivative of the equilibrium asset price with respect to the loan
rate:
dP ∗
drL
= − C
r2L
+
τ (Xs (P ∗))
θr2L
− τ
0 (Xs (P ∗))X 0s (P )
θrL
dP ∗
drL
.
Therefore,
dP ∗
drL
∙
1 +
τ 0 (Xs (P ∗))X 0s (P )
θrL
¸
= −P
∗
rL
.
Since b00 (·) = τ 0 (·) > 0, X 0s (·) > 0 and P ∗ ≥ 0, it follows that dP
∗
drL
< 0. In
turn, dXs(P
∗)
drL
< 0. Note that market-clearing implies a demand function,
Xd (rL) for any realization Xs (P ), which is given by Xd (rL) = Xs (P ∗ (rL))
and is decreasing in rL.
Let rfL denote the fundamental (gross) lending rate which is the rate
obtained in the absence of any agency problems. Recall that rfL is given by
expression (9). Then the fundamental asset price is given by the fixed-point
condition:
P f =
θC − τ (Xs)
θrfL
. (21)
Having derived the fundamental asset price we can next define an asset
price bubble. An asset price bubble is formed whenever P ∗ > P f since the
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asset is overpriced. Note that P ∗ > P f as long as rL < r
f
L. A lending rate
lower than the fundamental rate creates a high demand for the asset which
leads to an increase in asset prices over and above the fundamental values.
From Proposition 4 we know that for high enough bank liquidity (D >
D∗) an agency problem is actuated and as a result the loan rate set by the
manager is lower than the fundamental rate. Thus, we immediately have
the following corollary to Proposition 4.
Corollary 1 In the presence of an agency problem between the bank man-
ager and the equityholders, an asset price bubble is formed for high enough
bank liquidity.
To better understand the mechanics behind the formation of a bubble,
the four-quadrant diagram in Figure 4 is useful. Quadrant I in the figure
depicts the relationship between the risk of project failure, (1− θ), and the
loan rate, rL, charged by the bank. In general the higher this risk the higher
would be the equilibrium lending rate as is captured by the line AA. The
loan rate in turn determines the demand for loans and the volume of credit in
the economy. For any given lending rate, the expected amount of bank loans
is given by E [L (rL) |eH ]. Since L0 (rL) < 0 we know that the lower the loan
rate the higher is the amount of expected investment in the economy as is
captured by the line NN in quadrant II. The increase in investment pushes
up the asset demand which in turn pushes up asset prices. This relationship
between the demand for the asset and the asset price is captured by the line
Y Y in quadrant III. Finally quadrant IV derives the relationship between
the asset price and risk. In general, the higher is the underlying risk the
lower will be the asset price as is depicted by the line ZZ.
However, the equilibrium relationship between asset price and risk is
derived by tracing the effect of risk on the loan rate, which in turn has an
effect on the amount of investment which subsequently determines the asset
price. Let the line AA represent the fundamental relationship between risk
and the bank loan rate, i.e. the relationship that would be obtained in the
absence of agency issues. Then for any given level of risk, the fundamental
asset price would be represented by the line ZZ. However, as we showed
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Figure 4: The mechanics of the formation of asset price bubbles.
in Proposition 4, an agency problem is actuated for sufficiently high bank
liquidity levels whereby the bank loan rate is lowered for any given level of
risk. This in turn shifts the AA line to A1A1. From quadrant II we know that
the expected volume of credit in the economy increases following lower loan
rates. Consequently asset prices increase as a result of market-clearing as is
shown in quadrant III. The final relationship between asset prices and risk
is shown in quadrant IV and the actuation of the principal-agent problem
shifts the ZZ line to Z1Z1. In the end, the asset price is higher for the same
level of risk once the agency problem is actuated leading to the formation
of a bubble.
It is also interesting to note that our model implies that the size of the
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bubble is monotonic in the leverage of bank borrowers. This is because bank
borrowers in the model borrow more the lower the lending rates offered by
the banks. The greater the severity of the agency problems, the lower are
the lending rates, and the higher is the borrower leverage and asset price.
To summarize, our model helps explain how agency problems in the
banking sector can induce the formation of asset price bubbles. In terms of
the four-quadrant diagram we would be reducing our attention to quadrant
IV alone in relating risk to asset price if we ignore the role of the banking
sector. Embedding the banking sector in a pricing framework gives us a fuller
picture of how the banking sector contributes to equilibrium investment
demand and asset prices in the economy.
3 When are bubbles likely to be formed?
3.1 High macroeconomic risk
Given asset price bubbles are formed when bank liquidity is substantially
high, the question that arises is when are banks most likely to be flushed
with liquidity. In an empirical study, Gatev and Strahan (2006) find that
as spreads in the commercial paper market increase, bank deposits increase
and bank asset (loan) growth also increases. The spreads on commercial
paper are a measure of the investors’ perception of risk in the real economy.
Intuitively, when investors are apprehensive of the risk in the entrepreneurial
sector they are more likely to deposit their investments in banks rather than
make direct investments.17
To formalize the above intuition we integrate with the model the entre-
17The flight of depositors to banks may be due to banks having greater expertise in
screening borrowers during stress times, inducing a natural negative correlation between
the usage of lines of credit and deposit withdrawals as argued by Kashyap, Rajan and
Stein (2002). Alternatively, the flight may simply be due to the fact that bank deposits
are insured (up to a threshold) by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
whereas commercial paper and money market funds are uninsured, at least until the
extraordinary actions taken by the Federal Reserve during 2008 and 2009. Pennacchi
(2006) finds evidence supportive of this latter hypothesis by examining lending behavior
of banks during crises prior to the creation of the FDIC.
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preneurial or the corporate sector that can raise direct external financing
from investors, endogenize the decision of investors to fund the corporate
sector (e.g. through commercial paper debt) or to save in bank deposits, and
show that bank deposits will increase at a time when the underlying eco-
nomic risk increases. Consider an economy where entrepreneurs have access
to projects that yield a terminal cash flow Ce if it succeeds and 0 otherwise.
The probability of success depends partly on the realization of the state vari-
able, θ˜, and partly on the entrepreneurs’ effort decision, , which identifies
whether the entrepreneur is diligent ( = 1) or shirks ( = 0) in which case,
entrepreneurs extract a private benefit of B. If the entrepreneur is diligent,
the probability of success is θ but in the presence of shirking the probability
of success is ϕθ, where ϕ ∈ (0, 1). The realization of the state variable θ is
observable to the entrepreneurs, but not observable to investors.
Entrepreneurs promise to pay the risk-neutral investors who invest di-
rectly in their projects a face value of y. To ensure the concavity of the en-
trepreneur’s objective function we assume that there exists a non-pecuniary
financing cost, m (y), which satisfies the standard neoclassical conditions:
m0 (y) > 0 and m00 (y) > 0. We can then write the entrepreneur’s problem
as follows:
max
y
θ (Ce − y)−m (y) (22)
subject to
θy ≥ u¯ (23)
θ (1− ϕ) (Ce − y) ≥ B. (24)
Expression (22) represents the entrepreneur’s expected return. Con-
straint (23) is the investor rationality constraint which says that the ex-
pected return to the investor must at least equal the investor’s reservation
utility. Constraint (24) is the incentive compatibility constraint which says
that the expected entrepreneurial return conditional on the entrepreneur
being diligent exceeds his expected return from shirking.18 Hence, the en-
trepreneur chooses a face value, y∗, so as to maximize his expected return
18More formally, this implies the following: θ (Ce − y) ≥ ϕθ (Ce − y) + B. Simplifying
this inequality we get (24).
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subject to the investor rationality constraint and the incentive compatibility
constraint.
We can then prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5 There exists a θ∗such that for θ < θ∗, the entrepreneur’s
incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied and the expected return to
the investor fails to satisfy the investor rationality constraint.
The above proposition says that for high enough macroeconomic risk the
contract offered by the entrepreneur to investors is not incentive compatible.
Intuitively, if macroeconomic risk is sufficiently high, the probability of suc-
cess is low and thus the entrepreneur has little incentive to exert effort and
is better off by shirking and consuming his private benefit. Since investors
earn on average u¯ from bank investments, in the presence of entrepreneurial
moral hazard investors will be better off by depositing their endowments in
banks. On the other hand, if θ ≥ θ∗, entrepreneurs can attract investors by
offering them an expected return slightly above u¯.
Even though bank investments are perceived to be safer vis-a-vis direct
entrepreneurial investments, we allow for the possibility that if the macroeco-
nomic risk is extremely high investors may prefer to invest their endowments
in government securities such as Treasury bills rather than bank deposits.
From the participation constraint (7), as macroeconomic risk deteriorates
the bank offers a higher deposit rate in compensation for the added risk
so as to ensure that investors receive on average their reservation utility.
However, in practice a very high deposit rate offered by a bank may not be
sustainable due to attendant agency problems between depositors and bank
owners (e.g., the risk-shifting problem as in Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
To capture this effect in a reduced form, we impose an upper bound on rD
such that rD ≤ r¯D. It then follows from (7) that for a sufficiently high
macroeconomic risk, say (1− θ), the bank’s participation constraint is not
satisfied and investors would thus prefer to consume their reservation utility,
u¯, where u¯ can be interpreted as a return from investment in Treasury bills.
In summary, if investors observe θ identically, then all investments will
be channeled directly into entrepreneurial projects if θ ≥ θ∗, into banks if
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θ ∈ [θ, θ∗) and into T-bills if θ < θ. However, in order to make a more
realistic distribution of investments we assume each investor receives an
imperfect signal, s, on the basis of which they decide how to allocate their
endowments. A signal sj = g received by investor j is a good signal which
implies that θ ≥ θ∗; a signal sj = bL is a bad signal which would be an
indication to the investor that θ ∈ [θ, θ∗); and finally a signal sj = bH is a
very bad signal indicating that θ < θ. The probability distribution of the
signals is assumed to be identical and independent across depositors and
given as:
Pr (s = g) = νθ,
Pr
¡
s = bL
¢
=
(
τ (1− νθ)
χνθ
if θ ≥ θ
if θ < θ
,
Pr
¡
s = bH
¢
=
(
(1− τ) (1− νθ)
1− νθ (1 + χ)
if θ ≥ θ
if θ < θ
,
where ν ∈ (0, 1) and χ ∈ (0, 1). Investors only observe their own signals and
are not aware of the probability distribution of the signals. The above for-
mulation of the probability distribution implies that a proportion νθ˜ of the
investors will allocate their endowments to entrepreneurial projects while
a proportion 1 − νθ˜ will allocate their endowments to bank deposits and
T-bills. Note that as the macroeconomic state, θ, improves the amount of
direct entrepreneurial investment increases. Conversely, a deterioration of
the macroeconomic state results in a flight to quality to bank deposits. How-
ever, as the macroeconomic state starts deteriorating below the threshold θ
bank liquidity is adversely affected since investors prefer to invest in T-bills
and consume their reservation utility. The relationship between bank liq-
uidity and macroeconomic risk is illustrated by the liquidity-risk curve DD
in Figure 5.
We can then prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6 A bubble is formed in the economy when the macroeconomic
risk is high enough. More formally, there exists a threshold θc such that
P ∗ > P f if θ < θc where θc ∈ [θ, 1].
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Proof. See Appendix.
As macroeconomic risk increases, there is a flight to quality whereby in-
vestors prefer to invest in bank deposits rather than engage in direct lending
(as long as the macroeconomic risk is not extremely high). Subsequently,
banks find themselves flushed with liquidity during times when spreads in
the commercial paper market (i.e., the direct costs to entrepreneurs of fi-
nancing from investors) are high. This excessive liquidity encourages bank
managers to increase the volume of credit in the economy by mispricing
underlying risk. And, this in turn fuels a bubble in asset prices.
3.2 Loose monetary policy
Before we turn to the implications for Central Bank’s monetary policy, we
briefly discuss how monetary policy has a direct effect on bank’s liquid-
ity. When embarking on an expansionary monetary policy via open market
operations, central banks buy government securities from primary dealers
who have accounts with depository institutions. The way this transaction
works in practice is that the central bank directly credits the reserves which
commercial banks have with the central bank, hence effectively increasing
the deposit base of the bank. On the other hand, in order to implement a
contractionary monetary policy, the central banks sell government securities
to primary dealers and at the same time debit their accounts which effec-
tively reduces the deposit base of banks. Hence bank deposits available on
bank balance-sheets for investment/lending purposes are a function of both
macroeconomic risk (θ), as in the previous section, as well as monetary
policy (M):
D = D (θ;M) . (25)
The above relationship is depicted in Figure 5. As discussed in the previous
section, as macroeconomic risk increases there is a flight to quality whereby
bank deposits increase and this continues until risk crosses the threshold
(1− θ) after which more and more investors withdraw even from the banking
sector and prefer to just consume their reservation utility. In the absence
of an active monetary policy, the relationship between bank liquidity and
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Figure 5: The interplay between bank liquidity, macroeconomic risk and
monetary policy.
risk is given by DD. However, following an expansionary monetary policy,
bank liquidity increases for the same level of risk and the DD line shifts
upwards to D+D+. Conversely, subsequent to a contractionary monetary
policy, bank liquidity decreases for the same level of risk and consequently
the DD line moves downwards to D−D−.
In the figure, D∗ is the liquidity threshold above which asset price bub-
bles are formed. When macroeconomic risk increases above (1− θc) to say¡
1− θ1
¢
, bank liquidity crosses the threshold D∗ to D1 leading to the for-
mation of a bubble. However the central bank can offset this effect via a
contractionary monetary policy which will shift the DD line downwards.
The magnitude of the contractionary monetary policy should be such that
the DD line moves downwards to at least D−D−. As can be seen from
the figure this is the minimum shift that is required to ensure that for the
new level of risk
¡
1− θ1
¢
, bank liquidity is at or below D∗. It is interesting
to note from Figure 5 that even if the macroeconomic risk level is below
(1− θc), central banks can fuel asset price bubbles by adopting loose mon-
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etary policies thereby shifting the DD line upwards such that the liquidity
level crosses the threshold D∗.19
4 Optimal monetary policy
We next formalize the argument in Section 3.2 and study implications for
optimal monetary policy in the presence of the following trade-off faced by
the central bank: An increase in money supply increases aggregate invest-
ment, but an increase in money supply also increases bank liquidity and we
know from our earlier results that excessive bank liquidity can induce bub-
bles in asset prices. As discussed formally in the extension (section A.2 of
the Appendix) bubbles are costly given that aggressive behavior of managers
and underpriced loan rates result in a deterioration in the quality of bank in-
vestments which in turn increases the average default risk and hence the ex-
pected deadweight costs of default. Let the expected cost of the bubble, con-
ditional on P > P f , be denoted by Ω (∆), where∆ ≡ E
£¡
P − P f
¢ |P > P f¤
denotes the expected size of the bubble. We make the plausible assump-
tion that the cost of the bubble increases with the size of the bubble, i.e.
Ω0 (∆) > 0. (This is also shown formally in extension A.2 of the Appendix).
The trade-off faced by the central bank can be expressed by the following
expected welfare (objective) function:
max
M∗
W = L¯H (rL)− [Pr (D (θ) > D∗)Ω (∆)] (26)
where M∗ denotes the optimal money supply and L¯H (rL) ≡ E [L (rL) |eH ]
represents the expected demand for bank loans conditional on high effort
exerted by bank managers. Since bank borrowers have zero wealth, L¯H also
represents the expected investment made by borrowers. The second term
denotes the expected cost of a bubble since a bubble is formed when deposits
cross the threshold D∗.
19 Indeed Kindleberger (2005) in his study on the history of financial crises notes that:
“Speculative manias gather speed through expansion of money and credit.” Furthermore,
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon.”
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Taking the derivative of (26) with respect to M we get the first-order
condition:
L¯0H
drL
dM
= Ω (∆)
∂ Pr (D > D∗)
∂M
+Pr (D > D∗)
∂Ω (∆)
∂M
(27)
where L¯0H = ∂L¯
0
H/∂rL. The LHS in (27) represents the marginal benefits
(MB) of expansion. The RHS represents the marginal costs (MC) of expan-
sion. Thus the central bank expands money supply up to the point where
the marginal benefits of expansion (in terms of increased investment) just
equal the marginal costs of expansion (in terms of a higher likelihood of a
bubble and the associated costs).
We assume that the SOC is satisfied, namely: ∂MB∂M <
∂MC
∂M . This will
be the case if there exist diminishing returns on investment and if the mar-
ginal cost of a bubble is a non-decreasing function of the money supply. The
assumption of diminishing returns to investment implies that as money sup-
ply increases, the marginal benefits (in terms of higher investment) increase
but at a decreasing rate. As discussed in section A.2 of the appendix, man-
agers progressively making worse quality loans can explain the diminishing
returns on investment. The assumption that the marginal cost of a bubble
is a non-decreasing function of money supply implies that as bank liquidity
and subsequently the expected size of the bubble increases, the incremental
cost of the bubble does not decrease. This is also plausible because if any-
thing we expect the marginal cost of a bubble to be an increasing function
of the size of the bubble.
We can now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The optimal monetary policy dictates that the central bank
decrease the money supply as macroeconomic risk, (1− θ), increases as long
as the size of the bubble is increasing in macroeconomic risk, i.e., d∆/dθ < 0.
However, if the size of the bubble is decreasing in macroeconomic risk,
i.e., d∆/dθ > 0, then the optimal monetary policy dictates that the cen-
tral bank increase the money supply as macroeconomic risk increases. More
formally,
dM∗
dθ
(
> 0
< 0
if d∆dθ < 0
if d∆dθ > 0
.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the above proposition is as follows: If the expected
size of the bubble is increasing in macroeconomic risk, i.e. d∆dθ < 0, say
for instance due to a flight to quality effect which increases bank liquidity,
then this raises the cost of bubbles. The central bank can counter this
effect by decreasing the money supply and hence draining out liquidity from
the banking system. If, on the other hand, bank liquidity is decreasing
in macroeconomic risk and consequently the expected size of the bubble
decreases as the underlying risk increases, i.e. d∆dθ > 0, say for instance, due
to investors’ loss of confidence in times of a crisis, then the central bank can
offset this effect by increasing the money supply. In other words, the central
bank should lean against macroeconomic risk as long as the expected cost of
a bubble is increasing with risk, but should lean with macroeconomic risk as
long as the expected cost of a bubble is decreasing with risk.
Proponents of the Greenspan camp may argue that the central bank
may not be aware where we are in the business cycle and hence whether
bank liquidity is increasing or decreasing in macroeconomic risk. Neverthe-
less, it can be shown that a much simpler policy recommendation is to lean
against bank liquidity regardless of where we are in the business cycle. The
optimality of this policy is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The optimal monetary policy implies a leaning against liq-
uidity approach, i.e., tightening monetary policy in times of excessive bank
liquidity and loosening monetary policy in times of falling bank liquidity.
More formally, dM
∗
dD < 0 ∀θ.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition is intuitive. In times of excessive bank liquidity,
bubbles are likely to be formed and the central bank can avoid the formation
of bubbles by tightening monetary policy. On the other hand, in times of
scarce liquidity, banks raise loan rates and hence aggregate investment is
adversely affected. The central bank can prevent the fall in investment by
loosening monetary policy.
We thus argue that the ‘Greenspan put’ should be employed in times of
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falling bank liquidity. However, in times when banks are flush with liquid-
ity, a loose monetary policy only enhances the liquidity insurance enjoyed
by banks, and thus aggravates their risk-taking incentives. This in turn
increases the likelihood of bubbles in asset prices.
4.1 Discussion
Traditionally, as suggested by the Taylor rule, monetary policy has tar-
geted interest rates and employment. However, in the light of our results,
we argue that monetary policy should also target asset prices. Our results
suggest that asset prices can be targeted if the monetary authorities adopt
a “leaning against liquidity” approach. In fact we showed that a “leaning
against liquidity” policy performs a twofold purpose: In times of abundant
liquidity it counters the surge in asset prices, whilst in times of scarce liquid-
ity it performs the role of quantitative easing and subsequently encourages
investment.
Allen and Gale in their book “Understanding financial crises” document
the following: “In Finland an expansionary budget in 1987 resulted in mas-
sive credit expansion. The ratio of bank loans to nominal GDP increased
from 55 percent in 1984 to 90 percent in 1990. Housing prices rose by a
total of 68 percent in 1987 and 1988... In Sweden a steady credit expansion
through the late 1980’s led to a property boom.” These observations are
perfectly in line with our model. Loose monetary policies can potentially
lead to excessive liquidity in the banking system which in turn encourages
bank mangers to underprice the underlying risk and thereby increase the
volume of credit in the economy. This in turn creates an asset price bubble.
Our model can also explain how lax monetary policy in Japan during
the mid 1980s led to asset price inflation. Bank of Japan (BOJ) reduced the
official discount rate five times between January, 1986 and February, 1987,
leaving it finally at 2.5 percent. It is widely accepted that the easy credit
policies adopted by BOJ created excess liquidity in the Japanese economy,
as also acknowledged by Goyal and Yamada (2004). The sequence of events
started with the Plaza Accord (1985), in which the G5 countries agreed
on a stronger yen so as to lower the U.S. trade deficit. However, BOJ’s
33
intervention in foreign exchange markets appreciated the yen rapidly. Re-
sponding to the strengthening yen and seeking to avert deflationary effects
in the domestic economy, Bank of Japan lowered interest rates and conse-
quently increased liquidity in the economy. In the subsequent years a large
real estate bubble was formed.
One of the causes of the current subprime crisis has been suggested to
be the loose monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve in the United
States. In 2003, the Fed lowered the federal funds rate to 1% - a level
that at that time was last seen only in 1958. Subsequently banks mispriced
risk and indulged in over-lending which finally culminated in the subprime
crisis. In fact the world was awash with liquidity prior to the crisis. We
would thus argue that this excess of liquidity contributed significantly in
causing the crisis. In their counter-factual exercise, Bean et al. (2010) show
that (see their Table 3) an interest rate scenario of 2.5% greater than the
Federal Reserve policy rates in 2005 and 2006 would have reduced annual
real house price growth by 7%, and 10%, respectively. Also consistent with
our model, Geanakoplos (2010) documents that banks progressively made
worse loans from 2003 to 2006; the down payment for mortgages fell from
10%, on average to a low of 2% while the Case Shiller House Price Index
climbed from 145 to 190.
The issue of when a central bank should tighten monetary policy follow-
ing a crisis has resurfaced in the aftermath of the rescue packages adminis-
tered to recover from the crisis of 2007-09. For instance, the Federal Reserve
in the United States has discussed raising the interest paid to banks on their
reserves holdings and selling its inventory of mortgage-backed assets as po-
tential tools. The Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke has however assessed
that “The economy continues to require the support of accommodative mon-
etary policies. However, we have been working to ensure that we have the
tools to reverse, at the appropriate time, the currently very high degree of
monetary stimulus” (Financial Times, February 11 2010). Broadly though,
Chairman Bernanke has stated a preference for “leaving rates low for an
extended period.”
In contrast, some other countries have already started the monetary
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tightening process. China, in particular, has “ordered its commercial banks
to increase the reserves (by 50 basis points from February 25) they hold,
as an effort to control rapid lending, rather than significantly tighten mon-
etary policy” (Financial Times, February 13 2010). The Chinese economy
expanded by 10.7 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2009 and Chinese banks
issued a record Rmb9,600bn in new loans in 2009, about double the amount
from the previous year, which fueled a rapid increase in asset prices, espe-
cially in Chinese stock markets. House prices in China had increased by
7.8 per cent in December 2009 from the same month a year earlier (Finan-
cial Times, January 14 2010). Not surprisingly, given the results of our
model, the liquidity of Chinese banks also soared during this period. In
fact, household and corporate deposits in the Chinese banking system are
now equivalent to a record 150 per cent of gross domestic product (Financial
Times, March 3 2010).
Both of these examples get at the heart of our policy discussion. Our
model highlights that the key parameter to examine is the extent of bank
lending in the economy, as in the discussion about Chinese lending and asset
prices above. The model also highlights that the risk of the Federal Reserve
not tightening monetary policy sufficiently soon is precisely that lending
may take off by several multiples given the high levels of bank liquidity
(reserves) and force the central bank to either tighten excessively ex post or
be mopping up after the asset prices have been inflated too high.
4.2 Other policy tools
Another policy tool that central banks can employ to mitigate the formation
of asset price bubbles is the imposition of minimum liquidity requirements.
Suppose banks are required to maintain a minimum liquidity requirement
but are penalized whenever their liquidity falls below this level. In the ab-
sence of a minimum liquidity requirement a shortfall was induced in our
model whenever liquidity was insufficient to service withdrawals. However,
in the presence of a minimum liquidity requirement the bank suffers a liquid-
ity shortfall whenever its liquidity drops below the minimum requirement,
following which it suffers a penalty. Such a regulatory requirement will
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reduce the incentives of bank managers to act over-aggressively given the
potential penalty they will suffer in the event of a liquidity shortfall below
the minimum level. Nevertheless, as before, if bank liquidity is high enough
bank managers will indulge in risk-taking. However, the important differ-
ence is that the liquidity threshold, D∗, above which agency problems are
actuated will increase in the presence of minimum liquidity requirements.
This will reduce the probability of the formation of bubbles. Given that
bubbles are still formed in the presence of high enough liquidity, minimum
liquidity requirements are a complement but not a substitute to our recom-
mended policy tool of the central bank’s “leaning against liquidity”.
Finally, Naqvi (2007) shows that the central bank’s lender of last resort
operations need to be complemented ex ante by an efficient supervisory
framework so as to avoid the moral hazard repercussions of bail-outs. What
we learn from our paper is that such supervision is even more essential
during times when the banking system is flushed with liquidity. This is
because during such times bank managers are more likely to under-price
risk and hence over-invest. Thus adequate supervision in times of abundant
liquidity might be another possible tool to mitigate the risk-taking appetite
of banks.
5 Related Literature
While Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed that leverage induces equityhold-
ers to prefer excessive risk, our point is concerned with risk-taking incentives
inside banks as a function of liquidity. On this front, our paper is similar
to Myers and Rajan (1998) wherein access to liquidity allows financial firms
to switch to riskier assets, and the anticipation of such behavior, renders
them illiquid ex ante. The channel in our model is somewhat different in
that when banks are flush with liquidity, managers are hedged from the
downside risks they undertake, and this induces risk-taking incentives.
Allen and Gale (2000) show in a model of risk-shifting that uncertainty in
monetary policy acts to exacerbate risk-taking incentives ex ante and fosters
an asset price bubble. Diamond and Rajan (2008) show that lowering inter-
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est rates ex post may be desirable for a central bank in order to avoid bank
runs and fire sales, but that this can induce moral hazard and incentivize
banks to hold more illiquid assets. It may thus be desirable for the Central
Bank to commit to raising interest rates when they are low. In our model,
the focus is also on the ex-ante effects of central bank intervention. The
difference arises from the fact that our model embeds the principal-agent
problem between dispersed shareholders of banks and the loan officers or
the risk takers. The severity of the agency problem is affected by the avail-
ability of liquidity, and thus by central bank interventions. Importantly,
in the absence of bank-level agency problems, there is no excess in credit
growth and central bank interventions do not distort credit outcomes.
In another related paper, Farhi and Tirole (2009) study how monetary
policy has an affect on the collective behavior of banks. They argue that
banks have an incentive to correlate their risk exposures because if everyone
engages in maturity transformation (for example), authorities have little
choice ex post other than facilitating refinancing. They thus argue that
the optimal monetary policy is inherently time inconsistent. Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2007) also study the incentives for banks to correlate their risks
when regulatory forbearance (bailout policy) suffers from a time-consistency
problem. They show that banks may have an incentive to reduce their
correlations given the possibility that banks that do well can acquire failed
ones. However, if the rents obtained from such acquisitions are outweighed
by the bailout guarantee when many banks fail, then banks herd and seek
to maximize their asset correlation. In contrast to these papers, our paper
studies whether or not monetary policy should target asset prices given the
agency problems inherent in banks.
In a recent paper, Agur and Demertzis (2010) also argue that monetary
policy concerned with financial stability may have to be conservative and set
higher rates on average, but in reaction to negative shocks, be more aggres-
sive (compared to traditional monetary policy concerned only with inflation
or output), for example, engage in deeper but shorter-lived cuts when there
are negative macroeconomic shocks. Stein (2010) argues that banks do not
internalize the costs associated with issuing short-term debt and hence en-
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gage in the excessive creation of “money”. In the event of a crisis, banks are
forced to honour their short-term debts by selling assets at fire-sale prices
which results in a negative externality. Monetary policy can counteract this
externality by requiring banks to hold higher reserves. Angeloni, Faia, and
Lo Duca (2010) consider a model where an expansionary monetary policy en-
courages banks to increase their leverage thereby increasing the risk-taking
propensity of banks. They also argue that monetary policy should lean
against the wind so as to offset the risk-taking appetite of banks.
In empirical work, Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) find that the im-
pact of monetary policy on lending behavior is stronger for banks with less
liquid balance sheets. They interpret their results as support for a “bank
lending channel” of monetary policy. Their results are in line with our pa-
per whereby monetary policy has real effects on the economy via the bank
lending channel. A number of recent empirical papers have also evidence
directly in support of our theory. Adrian and Shin (2009) show that the ag-
gregate balance-sheet of financial intermediaries grows more rapidly in times
of asset price booms and that such times are also coincident with easing of
monetary policy. They argue that growth in financial sector balance-sheets
might be the relevant measure of liquidity to rein in the pro-cyclicality of its
risk choices. Jiminez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2009) use twenty-two
years of data from the credit register of Spain and find that bank risk-taking
increases following loose monetary policies. Using data from the Bolivian
credit register, Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2009) find that a reduction
in monetary policy rates spurs the granting of new loans at lower spreads.
Furthermore, they find that this effect is more pronounced for banks with
more agency problems. Maddaloni and Peydró (2009) find evidence that
low monetary policy rates have resulted in a softening of the lending stan-
dards in Europe and USA and that these results are stronger when banking
supervision is weak and when bank moral hazard problems are high. Fi-
nally, Berger and Bouwman (2010) test our theory and in confirmation of
our results find that high liquidity creation is accompanied by a high likeli-
hood of the occurrence of a crisis. Mei and Saunders (1997) show that the
real-estate lending of U.S. financial institutions exhibits a “trend-chasing”
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pattern, lending more when real estate returns are expected to be low and
vice-versa. They do not, however, relate the pattern to monetary policy.
Finally, we note that there are several alternative theories of bank lend-
ing over the cycle that are not directly related to liquidity and monetary
policy. Rajan (1994) argues that it is easier for loan officers to share blame
in bad times and this leads to herding and delay of loan-loss recognitions in
good times, inducing pro-cyclicality to bank lending policies. He also pro-
vides supporting empirical evidence based on the real-estate banking crisis
in Massachusetts, USA of the early 90’s. Thakor (2005) argues that bank
over-lending is due to banks permitting higher loan commitments and not
invoking the revocation clause during booms given reputational concerns.
Ruckes (2004) shows that in expansions banks reduce their screening activ-
ity which results in loans being extended to lower quality borrowers, but
that in economic downturns banks tighten credit standards. Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2006) show that as banks obtain private information about
borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may
loosen their lending standards resulting in lower profits and expanded aggre-
gate credit. The boom in lending makes banks more vulnerable to economic
downturns. Matsuyama (2007) analyses how a movement in borrower net
worth causes the composition of the credit to switch between investment
projects with different productivity levels, resulting in credit cycles (fluctu-
ations in net worth) and credit traps (low borrower net worth). Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2008) consider the collective limited liability of banks and
show that it induces herding as when banks fail, they impose a negative ex-
ternality on each other through information contagion. This limited liability
effect is stronger in downturns.
The view provided by our paper is complementary to these explanations
in that over-lending occurs in our model due to access to easy liquidity,
potentially tied to expansionary monetary policy, and manifest as higher
spot lending by banks.
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6 Conclusion
We develop a theory of bank lending explaining how the seeds of a crisis may
be sown when banks are flush with liquidity. The main empirical implication
of our model is that excessive liquidity induces risk-taking behavior on the
part of bank managers. In summary, we obtain the following results: (a)
bank managers will behave in an overly-aggressive manner by mispricing risk
when bank liquidity is sufficiently high; (b) asset price bubbles are formed
for high enough bank liquidity; (c) bubbles are more likely to be formed
when the underlying macroeconomic risk is high as it induces investors to
save with banks rather than make direct entrepreneurial investments; and,
finally (d) bubbles are more likely to be formed following loose monetary
policies adopted by the central bank.
We also show that the optimal monetary policy involves a “leaning
against liquidity” approach, i.e., a central bank should adopt a contrac-
tionary monetary policy at times when banks are awash with liquidity so as
to draw out their reserves; and it should adopt an expansionary monetary
policy at times when banks have scarce liquidity so as to boost investment.
Some, most notably Alan Greenspan, have argued that “we are never
certain where we are in the cycle”20 and hence monetary policy should not
be used to target asset prices. Nevertheless, our model showed that even
if this is the case a “leaning against liquidity” policy can be rationalized.
Thus we argue that monetary policy should target not just interest rates and
employment but also asset prices as they are reflections of the risk appetite
of the financial intermediation sector.
Finally, it should be noted that an increase in macroeconomic risk can
also increase bank liquidity of developed economies due to global imbalances.
For instance, Caballero (2009) argues that as a result of the South East
Asian crisis and the NASDAQ crash there was an increased global demand
for safe securities and the U.S. financial system catered to this demand by
creating collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). This in turn was conducive
to global imbalances whereby there was an influx of liquidity in the U.S.
20Alan Greenspan, Financial Times, 27 May 08.
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financial system from emerging economies. Inevitably this increased the
liquidity of the U.S. banking system.
More broadly speaking, the rise in bank deposits in our model could
also be interpreted as capital inflows which find its way in the U.S. finan-
cial system. For instance, similarly to Caballero (2009), Jagannathan et
al. (2009) argue that after the stock market crash of 2000, savings from
China flowed into the U.S. debt market. The flow of money into securitized
mortgage pools drove down the cost of borrowing resulting in a housing
bubble. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) also show that standard indicators for
a financial crisis include rising leverage and asset price inflation. Further-
more they find that leverage booms and asset price inflations are preceded
by large capital inflows. In fact, as suggested by Jagannathan et al. (2009)
an increase in global (rather than just domestic) macroeconomic risk can
also lead to capital inflows into developed economies such as the U.S. given
that U.S. Dollar is the reserve currency of the world and most commodi-
ties are traded in Dollars. The U.S. is thus a natural recipient of liquidity
from developing and emerging countries wishing to build up their reserves
as a buffer against increasing macroeconomic risk. To the extent that such
liquidity finds its way into the banking system, global imbalances can also
actuate agency problems within banks resulting in a mispricing of risk and
bubble formation. We aim to explore these linkages further in our future
work.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The participation constraint of the bank will
be binding because otherwise the bank can increase its expected profits by
slightly reducing rD. Thus, r∗D is given by the solution to the following:
E (x˜) + (1−E (x˜))
∙
θrD + (1− θ)
E [max (R− x˜D, 0)]
D
¸
= u¯
Solving for r∗D we get (5).
We can then substitute r∗D in the bank’s objective function and hence r
∗
L
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will be the solution to the following unconstrained maximization problem:
max
r∗L
Π = θ {rLL (rL)− r∗DD (1−E (x˜)) +E [max (R− x˜D, 0)]}
−rpE [max (x˜D −R, 0)] .
Assuming that Π is quasi-concave in rL and noting that R = D − L, the
maximum is characterized by the following first order condition:
∂Π
∂rL
= θL (rL)− θPr [x˜D < R]L0 (rL) + θrLL0 (rL)
−rp Pr [x˜D ≥ R]L0 (rL)− θD (1−E (x˜))
∂r∗D
∂rL
= 0. (28)
Noting that ∂r∗D/∂rL = (1− θ) Pr [x˜D < R]L0 (rL) /θD (1−E (x˜)) and solv-
ing for rL after some simplification we get (4). Thus the optimal reserve level
is given by R∗ = D − L (r∗L) which proves the first part of the proposition.
From the FOC (28), if we solve for r∗L directly without exploiting the
definition of ηL we get the following expression for the return on loans:
r∗L =
1
θ
− L
L0
+
(rp − 1)Pr (x˜D ≥ R∗)
θ
(29)
Taking the partial derivative of the above expression w.r.t. θ we get:
∂r∗L
∂θ
= −1 + (rp − 1)Pr (x˜D ≥ R
∗)
θ2
< 0 (30)
since rp > rL > 1, which proves the second part of the proposition.
Next note that ∂ Pr (x˜D ≥ R) /∂D < 0, i.e. an increase in bank liquidity
(deposits) lowers the probability of liquidity shortfalls sinceR = D−L. Then
taking the partial derivative of (29) w.r.t. 1−F (R) = Pr (x˜D ≥ R) we get:
∂r∗L
∂ [1− F (R)] =
rp − 1
θ
> 0 (31)
Hence ∂r
∗
L
∂D =
∂r∗L
∂[1−F (R)]
∂[1−F (R)]
∂D < 0, which proves the third part of the
proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let μ1, μ2, μi3 denote the Lagrange multi-
pliers for constraints (11), (12) and (13) respectively. Taking the FOC wrt
w(L) we get
1
v0 (w (L))
= μ1 + μ2
∙
1− g (L (rL) |eL)
g (L (rL) |eH)
¸
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where g (L (rL) |e) is the density function of loans conditional on effort. As
is common in the literature, we then invoke the monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP), i.e. [g (L (rL) |eL) /g (L (rL) |eH)] is decreasing in L. In
words, this means that as bank loans increase, the likelihood of getting a
given level of loans and profits if effort is eH , relative to the likelihood if effort
is eL must increase. Given that v00 < 0, this implies that the manager’s wages
are monotonically increasing in L. Similarly, taking the FOC wrt ψ (S) we
get
1
c0 (ψ (S))
= μ1 +
X
i6=f
μi3
⎡
⎣1−
h
³
ψ (S) |riL < rfL
´³
ζ|riL < rfL
´
h
³
ψ (S) |rL = rfL
´³
ζ|rL = rfL
´
⎤
⎦ (32)
where h (·|·) represents the conditional density function of liquidity shortfalls
and (ζ|·) denotes the probability of the manager being penalized following an
audit conditional on whether or not the manager had acted over-aggressively.
Assuming that the MLRP holds, h
³
ψ (S) |riL < rfL
´
/h
³
ψ (S) |rL = rfL
´
is
increasing in S, which implies that 1/c0 is decreasing in S. Noting that
c00 (ψ) > 0, it follows that ψ (S) is increasing in liquidity shortfalls. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Taking the FOC of the bank’s maximization
problem with respect to φ we get
ζE [γrpS]−E (z|φ (S))− μ1ζE [c (γrpS)]
+
X
i6=f
μi3
n
E
h
ζc
³
γrpS|riL < rfL
´i
−E
h
ζc
³
γrpS|rL = rfL
´io
+(λ1 − λ2) = 0 (33)
where λ1 and λ2 correspond to the lagrange multipliers for the constraints
φ ≥ 0 and φ ≤ 1 respectively. An audit will take place if and only if
k (S) = ζE [γrpS]−E (z|φ (S))− μ1ζE [c (γrpS)]
+
X
i6=f
μi3
n
E
h
ζc
³
γrpS|riL < rfL
´i
−E
h
ζc
³
γrpS|rL = rfL
´io
> 0.
This is because if k (S) > 0 it implies that that λ2 > λ1. But λ2 > λ1 if and
only if the constraint φ ≤ 1 is binding as a binding constraint implies that
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λ2 > 0 but λ1 = 0. This would be the case if and only if φ = 1. It follows
that φ = 1 if k (S) > 0 and φ = 0 otherwise. Let S∗ denote the threshold
such that k (S∗) = 0. In order to prove that it is optimal to audit if and
only if S > S∗, it would suffice to show that k0 (S) is strictly increasing in
S.
Analogous to Dye (1985) it can be shown that after some simplification
the derivative of k (S) is given by h
³
ψ (S) |rL = rfL
´
dS times the following
expression:
Z
ψ0 (S)
⎛
⎝1− c0 (ψ (S))
⎛
⎝μ1 +
X
i6=f
μi3
⎡
⎣1−
h
³
ψ (S) |riL < rfL
´³
ζ|riL < rfL
´
h
³
ψ (S) |rL = rfL
´³
ζ|rL = rfL
´
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
·
³
ζ|rL = rfL
´
−
Z
z0 (S) .
where ψ0 (S) = dE[γrpS]dS . Substituting the value of 1/c
0 from equation (32)
in the above expression it is clear that the integrand of the first term is zero.
We know that z0
³
Πˆ
´
> 0. Since profits are decreasing in the amount of
liquidity shortfalls, S, this implies that z0 (S) < 0. It follows that k0 (S) > 0.
This proves the first part of the proposition.
Taking the FOC of the bank’s maximization problem with respect to γ
we get
J (S) + (λ3 − λ4) = 0
where J (S) represents the derivative of the Lagrangian exclusive of con-
straint (15) with respect to γ and λ3 and λ4 correspond to the lagrange
multipliers for the constraints γ ≥ 0 and γ ≤ γ¯ respectively. If J (S) < 0
that would imply (λ3 − λ4) > 0 which in turn corresponds to λ3 > 0 and
λ4 = 0. But if this were the case γ would equal zero and hence ψ = 0 which
would violate incentive compatibility as given by (32). Similarly, J (S) = 0
would imply that the principal is indifferent between any feasible value of
γ including γ = 0 which again violates incentive compatibility. Hence, by
contradiction, J (S) > 0 and λ3 < λ4. But λ3 < λ4 implies that λ4 > 0
and hence the constraint γ ≤ γ¯ is binding, whilst the constraint γ ≥ 0 is
slack. It follows that γ = γ¯ if an audit is carried out and it is inferred that
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the manager had acted over-aggressively. This proves the second part of the
proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. If the manager engages in overly-aggressive
behavior, his expected utility is given by the following expression:
E [v (βLa|e = eH)]−
³
ζ|rL < rfL
´
E [c (γ¯rpmax (S − S∗, 0) |e = eH)]− eH
= E [v (βLa|e = eH)]−
³
ζ|rL < rfL
´
E [c (γ¯rpmax (x˜D −Ra − S∗, 0) |e = eH)]
−eH
where Ra = D−La. (Note that choosing an expected loan volume is equiv-
alent to choosing a lending rate since there is a one-one mapping from the
lending rate to the expected loan volume).
However, in the absence of agency problems, the expected loan volume
is given by L¯fH = E
£
Lf |eH
¤
which denotes the expected loan volume in the
first-best world conditional on the manager exerting high effort. Thus the
expected utility of the manager in the absence of an agency problem is given
by
Πnam = E [v (βL
a|e = eH)]−
³
ζ|rL = rfL
´
E [c (γ¯rpmax (S − S∗, 0) |e = eH)]−eH .
(34)
Since the manager can consume this expected utility in the absence of
agency problems, Πnam can be treated as an opportunity cost in the agency
world. In other words, the manager has to earn at least Πnam in the agency
world as otherwise the manager would be better off by not acting over-
aggressively.
Thus the problem of the manager is to maximize
max
La
Πam = E [v (βL
a|e = eH)] (35)
−
³
ζ|rL < rfL
´
E [c (γ¯rpmax (S − S∗, 0) |e = eH)]− eH −Πnam
The first order condition is given by:Z
βv0 (·) dF (L|e = eH)−
³
ζ|rL < rfL
´
γ¯rp
Z
S∗
c0 (·) dH (S) = 0. (36)
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where F (·) and H (·) represent the distribution functions for loan volume
and liquidity shortfalls respectively. The second order condition is given by:Z
β2v00 (·) dF (L|e = eH)−
³
ζ|rL < rfL
´
(γ¯rp)2
Z
S∗
c00 (·) dH (S) < 0.
The SOC above is satisfied since v00 (·) < 0 and c00 (·) > 0.
Differentiating the total derivative of the FOC wrt D we get:
∂2Πam
∂La2
dLa∗
dD
+
∂2Πam
∂La∂D
= 0.
where La∗ denotes the optimal loan volume in the agency world.
Since ∂
2Πam
∂L¯a2H
< 0 given the SOC, it follows that
sign
µ
dLa∗
dD
¶
= sign
µ
∂2Πam
∂La∂D
¶
Thus one needs to prove that ∂
2Πam
∂La∂D > 0 as this would imply that an increase
in deposits would increase the optimal loan volume and hence overall the
manager would be better off.
Taking the partial derivative of (36) wrt D we obtain:
−
³
ζ|rL < rfL
´
(γ¯rp)2
Z
S∗
(− (1− x)) c00 (·) dH (S)
=
³
ζ|rL < rfL
´
(γ¯rp)2
Z
S∗
(1− x) c00 (·) dH (S) > 0.
The above inequality holds since c00 (·) > 0. It follows that dLa∗dD > 0.
Hence as deposits increase, manager’s have an incentive to increase the
loan volume (via setting a lower lending rate) since this increases their ex-
pected utility. Let D∗ denote the deposit threshold such that expression
(35) is zero. It follows that for high enough deposits (i.e. D > D∗) manage-
rial utility from acting over-aggressively exceeds their utility conditional on
setting the first-best rate (i.e. their opportunity cost). Conversely, for low
enough liquidity (i.e. D < D∗) there will be no agency problems as in this
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case the manager would be better off by setting the first best lending rate.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since the maximand (22) is decreasing in y
it follows that constraint (23) is binding and thus y∗ = u¯/θ. Inserting y∗ in
constraint (24) we can rewrite the incentive compatible constraint (24) as
follows:
θ ≥ θ∗
where
θ∗ =
1
Ce
∙
B
1− ϕ + u¯
¸
.
It follows that if θ < θ∗ the incentive compatible constraint does not hold.
Thus the incentive compatible payoff, y∗, will not be achievable given that
the investor rationality constraint (23) is based on an incentive compatible
contract. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Comparing (20) with (21) we know that
P > P f if and only if rL < r
f
L. From the proof to Proposition 4 we know
that rL < r
f
L for sufficiently high D. Let D
∗ denote the threshold below
which rL < r
f
L and assume the plausible that the number of investors I is
big enough so that D∗ exists. Hence all we need to show is that dDdθ < 0
∀θ ∈ [θ, 1]. Since D = τ (1− νθ) I ∀θ ∈ [θ, 1] it follows that dDdθ = −τνI < 0
∀θ ∈ [θ, 1]. SinceD is monotonically decreasing in θ for all θ ∈ [θ, 1] it follows
that there exists a threshold θc below which D > D∗ and hence P > P f ,
where θc is such that it solves D∗ = τ (1− νθc) I. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Differentiating the total derivative of the
FOC (27) wrt θ we get:
∂2W
∂M2
dM∗
dθ
+
∂2W
∂M∂θ
= 0.
Since ∂
2W
∂M2 < 0 given the SOC, it follows that
sign
µ
dM∗
dθ
¶
= sign
µ
∂2W
∂M∂θ
¶
.
Taking the partial derivative of (27) wrt θ we obtain after some simplifica-
tion:
∂2W
∂M∂θ
= −∂ Pr (D > D
∗)
∂M
∂Ω (∆)
∂θ
− ∂Ω (∆)
∂M
∂ Pr (D > D∗)
∂θ
. (37)
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We know that ∂ Pr(D>D
∗)
∂M > 0 since an increase in the money supply increases
bank liquidity. Also,
∂Ω (∆)
∂θ
= Ω0 (∆)
d∆
dθ
Given that Ω0 (∆) > 0, it follows that the first term in (37) is positive if
d∆
dθ < 0 and vice versa. Similarly,
∂Ω (∆)
∂M
= Ω0 (∆)
d∆
dM
where d∆dM > 0 since an increase in money supply increases bank liquidity,
lowers the loan rate and thus increases ∆. This implies that the expected
marginal cost of monetary expansion is positive.
Next note that ∂D∂θ < 0 is a necessary condition for
d∆
dθ < 0 since the
expected size of the bubble increases as liquidity increases. Conversely,
∂D
∂θ > 0 is a necessary condition for
d∆
dθ > 0. It follows that,
∂ Pr (D > D∗)
∂θ
(
< 0
> 0
if d∆dθ < 0
if d∆dθ > 0
Thus, the second term in (37) is positive if d∆dθ < 0 and vice versa. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. Differentiating the total derivative of the
FOC (27) wrt D we get:
∂2W
∂M2
dM∗
dD
+
∂2W
∂M∂D
= 0.
Since ∂
2W
∂M2 < 0 given the SOC, it follows that
sign
µ
dM∗
dD
¶
= sign
µ
∂2W
∂M∂D
¶
.
Taking the partial derivative of (27) wrt D we obtain after some simplifica-
tion:
∂2W
∂M∂D
= −∂ Pr (D > D
∗)
∂M
∂Ω (∆)
∂D
− ∂Ω (∆)
∂M
∂ Pr (D > D∗)
∂D
(38)
We know that ∂ Pr(D>D
∗)
∂M > 0. Also
∂Ω(∆)
∂D > 0 since an increase in bank
liquidity lowers the loan rate, increases expected asset prices and thus in-
creases ∆. Thus the first term is negative. Similarly, we know ∂Ω(∆)∂M > 0
and ∂ Pr(D>D
∗)
∂D > 0. Thus the second term is also negative. Q.E.D.
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Online Appendix
1 Extension: Bank’s objective function in the
presence of fire-sale prices for assets liquidated
prematurely.
In this appendix we will derive the bank’s objective function in a setup where
instead of taking the penalty cost term as exogenous we derive the term in an
environment where the bank can finance the liquidity shortfall by liquidating
assets at fire-sale prices. We show that the objective function in this setup has
the same generic form as that in the main body of the paper and hence the
qualitative results are unaffected.
The timing of the game is as follows. At time t = 0 the bank receives deposits
and then invests a fraction of these deposits in investment projects via loans to
entrepreneurs. A proportion of the total loans, L, are of very good quality such
that they repay early with probability 1 at t = 1. These loans are indexed by
Le and the rate of return on these loans is reL. However such investments are
scarce so the bank cannot make its entire investments in such assets. The rest of
the investments are made in assets which repay at t = 2 with a probability of θ.
These investments are indexed by L and the rate of return on these investments
is given by rL. Thus the total investment is given by L= L + Le. The rest of
the deposits are retained as reserves, R.
At time t = 1 the bank distributes a fraction of its ‘early returns’, reLL
e, to its
equityholders in the form of dividends where the dividend payout ratio is given
by d. For simplicity we normalize d = 1, which implies that the early returns
1
are accrued by the equityholders. Furthermore, at t = 1 the bank experiences
a random liquidity shock such that there are withdrawals of x˜D. If the bank
reserves at t = 1 are insufficient to service these withdrawals then the bank
will have to inefficiently liquidate a fraction, ξ, of its portfolio. The value of
the bank’s portfolio at t = 1 is given by reLL
e + rLθL. However, the fire-sale
value of the portfolio is c (reLL
e + rLθL), where c ∈ (0, 1). Thus the fraction of
premature liquidation is given by ξ = (xD −R) / [c (reLLe + rLθL)]. We assume
for simplicity that the value of the bank’s portfolio is high enough so that it can
service its withdrawals without going bankrupt. This is just for simplicity and
allowing for bankruptcy does not change the results.
Finally at time t = 2 the returns from bank investments, if any, are divided
amongst the depositors and the bank equityholders. With probability θ, the
return from the ‘late’ projects will be realized and the equityholders will consume
rLL− rDD (1− x˜) + (R− x˜D)+ where (R− x˜D)+ = R− x˜D if x˜D < R and 0
otherwise. Also note that the equityholders need to make the promised payment
rDD to the patient depositors. With probability 1 − θ the late projects fail
and the value of reserves is divided amongst the depositors. In this case the
equityholders only consume their dividends at t = 1.
Given this setup the expected profits of the bank’s equityholders is given by:
Π1 = Pr (x˜D < R) [θ {rLL− rDD (1−E (x˜)) +E [(R− x˜D) |x˜D < R]}+ reLLe]
+Pr (x˜D ≥ R) [θ {rL (1− ξ)L− rDD (1−E (x˜))}+ reL (1− ξ)Le] .
Since Pr (x˜D < R) = 1− Pr (x˜D ≥ R) and defining
πNF = θ {rLL− rDD (1−E (x˜)) +E [(R− x˜D) |x˜D < R]} and
πF = θ {rL (1− ξ)L− rDD (1−E (x˜))} we can rewrite the above as follows:
Π1 = (πNF + reLL
e)− Pr (x˜D ≥ R) [(πNF − πF ) + ξreLLe]
where (πNF − πF ) denotes the difference in the profits from the late projects
with and without fire sales while ξreLL
e denotes the loss in value from the early
projects due to fire sales. Thus the expected profit of the bank is given by
the expected profit in the absence of any fire sales, (πNF + reLL
e), minus the
probability of a liquidity shortage times the loss in value due to fire sales.
To show the qualitative equivalence of the above dynamic setup with that
of the static setup, we first note that πNF = π as defined in equation (3) of the
paper. Thus,
Π1 = (π + reLL
e)− Pr (x˜ ≥ R) [(πNF − πF ) + ξreLLe]
Note that reLL
e is a constant and hence maximizing Π1 w.r.t. rL and rD is
equivalent to maximizing the following
Π2 = π − Pr (x˜D ≥ R) [(πNF − πF ) + ξreLLe] (1)
Also note that [(πNF − πF ) + ξreLLe] is increasing in (x˜D −R) given that ∂πF∂ξ
< 0 and ∂ξ∂(x˜D−R) > 0. Thus [(πNF − πF ) + ξreLLe] is increasing in (x˜D −R).
2
Note the stark similarity of maximizing Π as in equation (1) of the paper with
that of equation (1) above. In both cases, the expected profit of the bank is
given by π minus a cost term that is proportional to the shortfall. Thus in the
main body of the paper, we use the simpler setup with an exogenous penalty
cost given that the qualitative results are unaffected.
2 Extension: Cost of a bubble
Suppose that bank borrowers have an outside option given by u¯B. In other
words, if they do not borrow from banks to invest in projects they can consume
their outside option. Furthermore, bank borrowers are heterogenous in the
sense that the project of borrower i succeeds with probability θi. Banks cannot
observe the success probability of individual entrepreneurs and hence under
a pooling equilibrium they set a loan rate which cannot be conditioned on the
individual θi’s but is based on the average risk of the participating entrepreneurs.
The projects require a capital of K and if the project succeeds it generates a
cash flow CK, where C > 1. For simplicity we assume that borrowers have
limited wealth and hence need to borrow k from banks in order to become
entrepreneurs. Given limited liability and a loan rate, rL, charged by banks,
borrower i will invest in his project and hence borrow from the bank if and only
if
θi (CK − rLK) ≥ u¯B
or if and only if
rL ≤ r¯iL =
CK − u¯B/θi
K
.
Hence as long as rL > r¯iL the agent would prefer to consume his outside option
and would invest in risky projects only if the loan rate is low enough.
Suppose that there are many entrepreneurs each with a unique success prob-
ability θi such that θ is uniformly distributed between [0, 1]. As long as there are
no agency problems between bank equityholders and bank managers, the loan
rate is given by rfL. Thus in the no-agency world, all entrepreneurs with r¯
i
L > r
f
L
will invest whilst the infra-marginal entrepreneur will be indifferent between in-
vesting and consuming his outside option. Thus the marginal entrepreneur’s
success probability, denoted by θm, satisfies the following:
rfL =
CK − u¯B/θm
K
or
θm =
u¯B
K
³
C − rfL
´ .
Hence the average success probability of the active entrepreneurs in the no-
agency world is given by:
θ¯ =
1 + θm
2
.
3
Next we introduce a cost of default in the economy denoted by Ψ. If the
projects of the (active) entrepreneurs fail then a default occurs and the economy
suffers a cost Ψ. This cost can take several forms. It could be a cost suffered
by the taxpayers who eventually foot the bill for bank bailouts. It could be a
cost suffered by the banking system: if banks are not bailed out it would be the
cost of bank failures; it can represent a reputational cost for banks; banks can
also face a cost in terms of tougher regulations (for instance limits on the size
of banks, limits on proprietary trading and/or higher regulatory taxes). Finally
it could represent a political cost borne by regulators. Hence in the absence of
agency problems, the average default cost of an active entrepreneur is given by
Ψ¯ =
¡
1− θ¯
¢
Ψ.
We have shown that in the presence of an agency problem, bank managers
act over-aggressively and set a loan rate, raL, such that r
a
L < r
f
L. When the loan
rate is lowered, this encourages over-investment and some agents who were pre-
viously consuming their outside options will have an incentive to indulge in bank
borrowing. In the presence of an agency problem, the marginal entrepreneur’s
success probability is given by:
θm0 =
u¯B
k (C − raL)
where θm0 < θm since raL < r
f
L. Hence the average success probability of the
active entrepreneurs in the presence of an agency problem is given by:
θ¯0 =
1 + θm0
2
.
It is clear that the average success probability of projects falls in the presence
of an agency problem. In other words, the average quality of loans deteriorates
when managers behave over-aggressively. The average default cost is now given
by
Ψ¯0 =
³
1− θ¯0
´
Ψ
where Ψ¯0 > Ψ¯.
Intuitively when managers act over-aggressively they set a loan rate which
encourages excessive borrowing. This leads to a deterioration of the average
quality of loans and hence increases the economy’s cost of default. Thus in
bubble periods there is over-investment due to a worsening of the quality of
loans. This in turn is conducive to higher default costs on average.
Thus the cost of the bubble can be defined as
Ω ≡ Ψ¯0 − Ψ¯.
Let ∆ ≡ P −P f denote the size of the bubble. Then note that Ω0 (∆) > 0. This
is because a reduction in lending rates (which implies an increase in asset prices
given equation (19)) lowers θm0 which in turn lowers θ¯0 and hence increases the
average default cost Ψ¯0. In other words, the cost of the bubble is increasing in
the magnitude of the bubble.
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